The following article is written by Ambassador Diego Arria reacting to the hostily against Israel in Venezuela:
Los ataques a La Sinagoga de Mariperez en Caracas
Hugo Chávez y las Fuerzas Armadas son los responsables por los actos de vandalismo en la Sinagoga de Mariperez. –dice Diego Arria ex Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas-Responsabilizar a malandros tarifados es distraer la atención a donde corresponde. El Presidente Chávez por su permanente predica publica del odio y de la violencia, y las Fuerzas Armadas por hacerse eco y respaldar esta campaña permanente de incitación al delito que lleva a grupos de maleantes tarifados por el régimen a cometer desmanes como este al igual que contra medios de comunicación y el Ateneo de Caracas. El Presidente Chávez no entiende que el uso y el abuso que el hace de los medios de comunicación masivos para promover en incitar la violencia , el odio y el crimen son considerados por los tribunales penales internacionales como los delitos mas graves. En Ruanda los que utilizaban la estación Mil Colinas fueron condenados a cadena perpetua-una pena incluso superior a la que recibieron algunos de los que participaron en la masacre de la etnia Tutsi. Por su parte la Fuerza Armada no acaba tampoco de entender que dada la desviación que han hecho de los fines y responsabilidades de la institución que han convertido en la base real de sustentación del régimen venezolano en lugar de la institución central que vele por la soberanía y el respeto a la constitución que son igualmente culpables por los delitos que se cometen al amparo de esta predica del odio y de la violencia que lideriza su comandante en jefe. El Estatuto de Roma del Tribunal Penal Internacional no puede ser mas claro al destacar que ningún jefe militar-ni policial- puede alegar el cumplimiento de ordenes superiores para excusar la comisión de delitos o la falta de acción para que no se comentan. Evidentemente que si en Venezuela funcionara la justicia estos delitos serían igualmente castigados. Y si la Fuerza Armada cumpliera con su rol principal que es la defensa de los derechos de los ciudadanos establecidos en la constitución no estaríamos presenciando con vergüenza y con tristeza como en un país abierto y generoso como el nuestro se registren estos hechos bochornosos bajo el amparo y la incitación de los poderes del Estado. Actos sin precedente en nuestra historia y que desdicen del gentilicio venezolano.
Diego E. Arria - Enero 31, 2008
Maru Angarita
My blog is: http://maruangarita.blogspot.com/
Saturday, January 31, 2009
Monday, January 12, 2009
Dictatorship for Dummies by O'Grady WSJ
Dictatorship for Dummies
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123172065020172341.html
Learn how to quash dissent Chávez-style.
By MARY ANASTASIA O'GRADY
Optimists have long theorized that Venezuela's Hugo Chávez would meet his Waterloo with the burst of the petroleum bubble. But with oil prices down some 75% from their highs last year and the jackboot of the regime still firmly planted on the nation's neck, that theory requires revisiting.
It is true that popular discontent with chavismo has been rising as oil prices have been falling. The disillusionment is even likely to increase in the months ahead as the economy swoons. But having used the boom years to consolidate power and destroy all institutional checks and balances, Mr. Chávez has little incentive to return the country to political pluralism even if most Venezuelans are sick of his tyranny. If anything, he is apt to become more aggressive and dangerous as the bloom comes off his revolutionary rose in 2009 and he feels more threatened.
Certainly "elections" can't be expected to matter much. Mr. Chávez now controls the entire electoral process, from voter rolls to tallying totals after the polls have closed.
Under enormous public pressure he accepted defeat in his 2007 bid for constitutional reforms designed to make him president for life. But so what? That loss allowed him to maintain the guise of democracy, and now he has decided that there will be another referendum on the same question in February. Presumably Venezuela will repeat this exercise until the right answer is produced.
All police states hold "elections." But they also specialize in combining the state's monopoly use of force with a monopoly in economic power and information control. Together these three weapons easily quash dissent. Venezuela is a prime example.
The Venezuelan government is now a military government. Mr. Chávez purged the armed forces leadership in 2002 and replaced fired officers with those loyal to his socialist cause. Like their counterparts in Cuba, these elevatedcomandantes are well compensated. Lack of transparency makes it impossible to know just how much they get paid for their loyalty, but it is safe to say that they have not been left out of the oil fiesta that compliant chavistas have enjoyed over the past decade. Even if the resource pool shrinks this year, neither their importance nor their rewards are likely to diminish.
Mr. Chávez has also taken over the Metropolitan Police in Caracas, imported Cuban intelligence agents, and armed his own Bolivarian militias, whose job it is to act as neighborhood enforcers. Should Venezuelans decide that they are tired of one-man rule, chavismo has enough weapons on hand to convince them otherwise.
Yet the art of dictatorship has been greatly refined since Stalin killed millions of his own people. Modern tyrants understand that there are many ways to manipulate their subjects and most do not require the use of force.
One measure that Mr. Chávez relies on heavily is control of the narrative. In government schools children are indoctrinated in Bolivarian thought. Meanwhile the state has stripped the media of its independence and now dominates all free television in the country. This allows the government to marinate the poor in Mr. Chávez's antimarket dogma. His captive audiences are told repeatedly that hardship of every sort -- including headline inflation of 31% last year -- is the result of profit makers, middlemen and consumerism.
The Orwellian screen is also used to stir up nationalist sentiment against foreign devils, like the U.S., Colombia and Israel. The audience has witnessed violence in Gaza through the lens of Hamas, and last week Mr. Chávez made a show of expelling the Israeli ambassador from Caracas.
Investments in revolution around South America may have to be pared back as revenues drop. But outreach to Iran and Syria is likely to continue since those relations may serve as a source of financing Mr. Chávez's military buildup. In December, the Italian daily La Stampa reported that it has seen evidence of a pact between Caracas and Tehran in which Iran uses Venezuelan aircraft for arms trafficking and Venezuela gets military aid in return. This month Turkish officials intercepted an Iranian shipment bound for Venezuela that reportedly contained materials for making explosives.
Despite all this, the most effective police-state tool remains Mr. Chávez's control over the economy. The state freely expropriates whatever it wants -- a shopping center in Caracas is Mr. Chávez's latest announced taking -- and economic freedom is dead. Moreover, the state has imposed strict capital controls, making saving or trading in hard currency impossible. Analysts are predicting another large devaluation of the bolivar in the not-too-distant future. The private sector has been wiped out, except for those who have thrown in their lot with the tyrant.
The drop in oil revenues may impoverish the state, but the opposition is even poorer. Organizing a rebellion against a less-rich Chávez remains a formidable task.
Write to O'Grady@wsj.com
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123172065020172341.html
Learn how to quash dissent Chávez-style.
By MARY ANASTASIA O'GRADY
Optimists have long theorized that Venezuela's Hugo Chávez would meet his Waterloo with the burst of the petroleum bubble. But with oil prices down some 75% from their highs last year and the jackboot of the regime still firmly planted on the nation's neck, that theory requires revisiting.
It is true that popular discontent with chavismo has been rising as oil prices have been falling. The disillusionment is even likely to increase in the months ahead as the economy swoons. But having used the boom years to consolidate power and destroy all institutional checks and balances, Mr. Chávez has little incentive to return the country to political pluralism even if most Venezuelans are sick of his tyranny. If anything, he is apt to become more aggressive and dangerous as the bloom comes off his revolutionary rose in 2009 and he feels more threatened.
Certainly "elections" can't be expected to matter much. Mr. Chávez now controls the entire electoral process, from voter rolls to tallying totals after the polls have closed.
Under enormous public pressure he accepted defeat in his 2007 bid for constitutional reforms designed to make him president for life. But so what? That loss allowed him to maintain the guise of democracy, and now he has decided that there will be another referendum on the same question in February. Presumably Venezuela will repeat this exercise until the right answer is produced.
All police states hold "elections." But they also specialize in combining the state's monopoly use of force with a monopoly in economic power and information control. Together these three weapons easily quash dissent. Venezuela is a prime example.
The Venezuelan government is now a military government. Mr. Chávez purged the armed forces leadership in 2002 and replaced fired officers with those loyal to his socialist cause. Like their counterparts in Cuba, these elevatedcomandantes are well compensated. Lack of transparency makes it impossible to know just how much they get paid for their loyalty, but it is safe to say that they have not been left out of the oil fiesta that compliant chavistas have enjoyed over the past decade. Even if the resource pool shrinks this year, neither their importance nor their rewards are likely to diminish.
Mr. Chávez has also taken over the Metropolitan Police in Caracas, imported Cuban intelligence agents, and armed his own Bolivarian militias, whose job it is to act as neighborhood enforcers. Should Venezuelans decide that they are tired of one-man rule, chavismo has enough weapons on hand to convince them otherwise.
Yet the art of dictatorship has been greatly refined since Stalin killed millions of his own people. Modern tyrants understand that there are many ways to manipulate their subjects and most do not require the use of force.
One measure that Mr. Chávez relies on heavily is control of the narrative. In government schools children are indoctrinated in Bolivarian thought. Meanwhile the state has stripped the media of its independence and now dominates all free television in the country. This allows the government to marinate the poor in Mr. Chávez's antimarket dogma. His captive audiences are told repeatedly that hardship of every sort -- including headline inflation of 31% last year -- is the result of profit makers, middlemen and consumerism.
The Orwellian screen is also used to stir up nationalist sentiment against foreign devils, like the U.S., Colombia and Israel. The audience has witnessed violence in Gaza through the lens of Hamas, and last week Mr. Chávez made a show of expelling the Israeli ambassador from Caracas.
Investments in revolution around South America may have to be pared back as revenues drop. But outreach to Iran and Syria is likely to continue since those relations may serve as a source of financing Mr. Chávez's military buildup. In December, the Italian daily La Stampa reported that it has seen evidence of a pact between Caracas and Tehran in which Iran uses Venezuelan aircraft for arms trafficking and Venezuela gets military aid in return. This month Turkish officials intercepted an Iranian shipment bound for Venezuela that reportedly contained materials for making explosives.
Despite all this, the most effective police-state tool remains Mr. Chávez's control over the economy. The state freely expropriates whatever it wants -- a shopping center in Caracas is Mr. Chávez's latest announced taking -- and economic freedom is dead. Moreover, the state has imposed strict capital controls, making saving or trading in hard currency impossible. Analysts are predicting another large devaluation of the bolivar in the not-too-distant future. The private sector has been wiped out, except for those who have thrown in their lot with the tyrant.
The drop in oil revenues may impoverish the state, but the opposition is even poorer. Organizing a rebellion against a less-rich Chávez remains a formidable task.
Write to O'Grady@wsj.com
Saturday, August 30, 2008
Cambios Militares by Yon Goicoechea
Cambios Militares
Article originally published on Facebook
Share
Friday, August 22, 2008 at 12:14pm
La Ley Orgánica de la Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana plantea aspectos gravísimos para la democracia, sin embargo, la misma resulta muy extensa para ser analizada en estas cortas líneas. Por ello, nos centraremos en dos puntos: (i) el ingreso y (ii) el ascenso militar.(i) El Ingreso: será determinado por el Presidente de la República. Esto pareciera ser un exceso ya que es absurdo pretender que el Presidente sea consciente de las credenciales de cada aspirante a la carrera militar. Ello podría servir para clasificar a los aspirantes a partir de sus inclinaciones políticas, dejando a un lado el proceso regular de evaluación. También se abre la posibilidad de regularizar el paramilitarismo en Venezuela, ya que la Ley plantea la incorporación a la Reserva de aquellos Venezolanos que así lo deseen, aún sin gozar de ninguna formación previa (artículo 50). ¡Imaginen que contentos estarán los Tupamaros, Carapiacas y demás grupos irregularmente armados, ahora que pueden ponerse un uniforme militar! (ii) El Ascenso: anteriormente, los oficiales a partir del grado de Coronel también eran promovidos por el Presidente, sin embargo, antes de llegar a esa instancia, los aspirantes debían pasar por tres filtros: La junta Apreciadora, La Junta Evaluadora y la Junta Calificadora. Estos órganos eran integrados por oficiales de rangos superiores a los de los aspirantes y garantizaban el mérito en la mayoría de los ascensos. Ahora, será Chávez el que pague y dé el vuelto, evaluando, proponiendo y, finalmente, ascendiendo a estos oficiales, sin que medie ningún proceso que no esté bajo su control. Estos cambios son relevantes políticamente porque generarán algunas lealtades infinitas para con el Presidente, sin embargo, también generarán malestares de aquellos oficiales que, aún teniendo el mérito, no puedan ascender. Apostamos a estos últimos, la Fuerza Armada ha sido un orgullo de los venezolanos desde la independencia, espero que sus miembros la protejan.
Article originally published on Facebook
Share
Friday, August 22, 2008 at 12:14pm
La Ley Orgánica de la Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana plantea aspectos gravísimos para la democracia, sin embargo, la misma resulta muy extensa para ser analizada en estas cortas líneas. Por ello, nos centraremos en dos puntos: (i) el ingreso y (ii) el ascenso militar.(i) El Ingreso: será determinado por el Presidente de la República. Esto pareciera ser un exceso ya que es absurdo pretender que el Presidente sea consciente de las credenciales de cada aspirante a la carrera militar. Ello podría servir para clasificar a los aspirantes a partir de sus inclinaciones políticas, dejando a un lado el proceso regular de evaluación. También se abre la posibilidad de regularizar el paramilitarismo en Venezuela, ya que la Ley plantea la incorporación a la Reserva de aquellos Venezolanos que así lo deseen, aún sin gozar de ninguna formación previa (artículo 50). ¡Imaginen que contentos estarán los Tupamaros, Carapiacas y demás grupos irregularmente armados, ahora que pueden ponerse un uniforme militar! (ii) El Ascenso: anteriormente, los oficiales a partir del grado de Coronel también eran promovidos por el Presidente, sin embargo, antes de llegar a esa instancia, los aspirantes debían pasar por tres filtros: La junta Apreciadora, La Junta Evaluadora y la Junta Calificadora. Estos órganos eran integrados por oficiales de rangos superiores a los de los aspirantes y garantizaban el mérito en la mayoría de los ascensos. Ahora, será Chávez el que pague y dé el vuelto, evaluando, proponiendo y, finalmente, ascendiendo a estos oficiales, sin que medie ningún proceso que no esté bajo su control. Estos cambios son relevantes políticamente porque generarán algunas lealtades infinitas para con el Presidente, sin embargo, también generarán malestares de aquellos oficiales que, aún teniendo el mérito, no puedan ascender. Apostamos a estos últimos, la Fuerza Armada ha sido un orgullo de los venezolanos desde la independencia, espero que sus miembros la protejan.
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Open Letter to Boris Johnson from G-400
G-400+ VENEZUELA
Boris Johnson May 9, 2008
Mayor of London
Greater London Authority
City Hall. The Queen's Walk
London
The G-400+Venezuela is dedicated to the preservation of freedom, human rights and democracy in Venezuela. (See full members list) http://g400mas.blogspot.com/
Dear Mayor Johnson
The G-400+Venezuela hastens to congratulate you for your recent victory as the new Mayor of London. A victory that we are celebrating after listening to your acceptance speech promising that: “Where there have been mistakes, we will rectify them”. The Livingstone-Chávez deal to provide cheap fuel for London’s buses and trams was a major mistake that for the sake of the poorest Venezuelans, as well as for the prestige of London, we trust that you will rectify.
When you see the video of the calamitous state of the children hospital in Caracas-which we are sending you- I am sure that you will be moved to communicate to the Chávez regime that the extravagant and perverse oil deal granted to your great capital should instead be used to provide decent and human care for the poor and abandoned children of our own capital city.
Two years ago, when Hugo Chávez was warmly welcomed in City Hall by Mayor Livingstone, the leader of the London Assembly Conservatives Richard Barnes, did not mince words: “Why does London, one of the richest capitals in the world, need to exploit a developing nation? This money would be better directed at the poor of Venezuela. London should not be doing business with third-rate South American dictators with an appalling human rights and democratic record."
Angie Bray another Conservative leader, added: "Ken Livingstone and the President of Venezuela should be ashamed of themselves for even contemplating such a proposal. I'm sure the 35% of Venezuelans who struggle below the poverty line, many of them critically so, would be shocked at the cynical siphoning off of their main asset to provide one of the world's most prosperous cities with cheap oil. "
We wish you great success as you proceed to “work flat out” for the people of London and for the poor children of my own city that are also counting on your promise to rectify errors. As you yourself said: “Let’s get cracking”
Sincerely yours,
Boris Johnson May 9, 2008
Mayor of London
Greater London Authority
City Hall. The Queen's Walk
London
The G-400+Venezuela is dedicated to the preservation of freedom, human rights and democracy in Venezuela. (See full members list) http://g400mas.blogspot.com/
Dear Mayor Johnson
The G-400+Venezuela hastens to congratulate you for your recent victory as the new Mayor of London. A victory that we are celebrating after listening to your acceptance speech promising that: “Where there have been mistakes, we will rectify them”. The Livingstone-Chávez deal to provide cheap fuel for London’s buses and trams was a major mistake that for the sake of the poorest Venezuelans, as well as for the prestige of London, we trust that you will rectify.
When you see the video of the calamitous state of the children hospital in Caracas-which we are sending you- I am sure that you will be moved to communicate to the Chávez regime that the extravagant and perverse oil deal granted to your great capital should instead be used to provide decent and human care for the poor and abandoned children of our own capital city.
Two years ago, when Hugo Chávez was warmly welcomed in City Hall by Mayor Livingstone, the leader of the London Assembly Conservatives Richard Barnes, did not mince words: “Why does London, one of the richest capitals in the world, need to exploit a developing nation? This money would be better directed at the poor of Venezuela. London should not be doing business with third-rate South American dictators with an appalling human rights and democratic record."
Angie Bray another Conservative leader, added: "Ken Livingstone and the President of Venezuela should be ashamed of themselves for even contemplating such a proposal. I'm sure the 35% of Venezuelans who struggle below the poverty line, many of them critically so, would be shocked at the cynical siphoning off of their main asset to provide one of the world's most prosperous cities with cheap oil. "
We wish you great success as you proceed to “work flat out” for the people of London and for the poor children of my own city that are also counting on your promise to rectify errors. As you yourself said: “Let’s get cracking”
Sincerely yours,
Wednesday, January 23, 2008
Mi pensamiento del dia por Raul Leoni
Mi pensamiento del dia por Raul Leoni
Leo la prensa y solo me queda pensar en la velocidad tan alarmante con la que nos movemos por este camino hacia el desastre por el cual Chávez lleva al país y a todos los venezolanos.
Según la empresa Alcaraz, Cabrera & Vázquez, dependiente de KPMG, la deuda adquirida por PDVSA y sus filiales el año pasado (2007) alcanzo la astronómica cifra de 16 mil millones de dólares. Para los que no estén claros de la magnitud de semejante deuda les diré que el presupuesto de la nación para el año 2008 es de 63,953 millones de dólares, lo que quiere decir que la deuda adquirida por PDVSA es equivalente al 25% de ese presupuesto.
Ya esta situación por si sola debería prender las señales de alarma, pero si a esto le sumamos que esos recursos no fueron a parar a gastos de inversión para el desarrollo de la industria sino que fueron directo a los bolsillos del estado convirtiéndolos en gasto público no reproductivo entonces la situación se torna más grave aun.
El gobierno ha fijado el precio del barril de petróleo para efectos del presupuesto en US $ 35 cuando en la realidad el precio promedio del 2007 fue de 62.61 dólares y además nos viene con otro embuste macro diciendo que las exportaciones para el mismo periodo se ubicaran en 3 millones de barriles diarios (y la producción total en 3.6 millones). Estos números no tienen otra finalidad que esconder la realidad del desastre en que esta inmersa nuestra industria petrolera. Para poder mantener la mentira de los volúmenes de producción se aumenta la misma y se reduce el precio para que los ingresos queden igual, pero el país y el mundo petrolero sabe de la alarmante caída en la producción de crudo la cual, según la OPEP, se ubica en los actuales momentos en 2.35 millones de barriles por día que al restar los 600 barriles diarios de consumo interno nos dejan 1.75 millones de barriles diarios para exportar. Hagan la matemática y verán.
Como si esto fuera poco, la principal industria del país es ahora también comercializadora de alimentos. Con la creación de otro mamotreto como lo es PDVAL, se le abre otro hueco financiero a la empresa pues todos sabemos de donde van a salir los recursos para la adquisición y comercialización de los productos a vender con sus consecuentes secuelas de corruptela y despilfarro que siempre vienen aunadas a este tipo de transacciones.
La inflación de Enero ya esta pisando el 6%, el desabastecimiento continua en rubros muy importantes de la dieta diaria y no hay perspectivas de que este mal mejore pues el gobierno con sus políticas lo que ha logrado es la destrucción del aparato productivo nacional. La corrupción bien gracias. El loco fajado en una contienda con Colombia en la quien lleva todas las de perder somos los venezolanos, y como si todo esto no fuera suficiente la declaración de amor hacia las FARC y el ELN.
¡Madre mía! Yo dije que pensaba que el 2008 iba a ser un año difícil pero confieso que ni remotamente se me ocurrió que iba a ser tan terrible. ¡Que Dios nos agarre confesados!
Raúl Leoni has a Bachelor of Science in Agricultural Economics.degree from Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. Mr. Leoni served as Representative in the Venezuelan Congress in 1984 - 1989. Mr. Leoni is the son of Venezuelan former President Raúl Leoni.
Resources:
http://www.bartleby.com/65/le/Leoni-Ra.html
Leo la prensa y solo me queda pensar en la velocidad tan alarmante con la que nos movemos por este camino hacia el desastre por el cual Chávez lleva al país y a todos los venezolanos.
Según la empresa Alcaraz, Cabrera & Vázquez, dependiente de KPMG, la deuda adquirida por PDVSA y sus filiales el año pasado (2007) alcanzo la astronómica cifra de 16 mil millones de dólares. Para los que no estén claros de la magnitud de semejante deuda les diré que el presupuesto de la nación para el año 2008 es de 63,953 millones de dólares, lo que quiere decir que la deuda adquirida por PDVSA es equivalente al 25% de ese presupuesto.
Ya esta situación por si sola debería prender las señales de alarma, pero si a esto le sumamos que esos recursos no fueron a parar a gastos de inversión para el desarrollo de la industria sino que fueron directo a los bolsillos del estado convirtiéndolos en gasto público no reproductivo entonces la situación se torna más grave aun.
El gobierno ha fijado el precio del barril de petróleo para efectos del presupuesto en US $ 35 cuando en la realidad el precio promedio del 2007 fue de 62.61 dólares y además nos viene con otro embuste macro diciendo que las exportaciones para el mismo periodo se ubicaran en 3 millones de barriles diarios (y la producción total en 3.6 millones). Estos números no tienen otra finalidad que esconder la realidad del desastre en que esta inmersa nuestra industria petrolera. Para poder mantener la mentira de los volúmenes de producción se aumenta la misma y se reduce el precio para que los ingresos queden igual, pero el país y el mundo petrolero sabe de la alarmante caída en la producción de crudo la cual, según la OPEP, se ubica en los actuales momentos en 2.35 millones de barriles por día que al restar los 600 barriles diarios de consumo interno nos dejan 1.75 millones de barriles diarios para exportar. Hagan la matemática y verán.
Como si esto fuera poco, la principal industria del país es ahora también comercializadora de alimentos. Con la creación de otro mamotreto como lo es PDVAL, se le abre otro hueco financiero a la empresa pues todos sabemos de donde van a salir los recursos para la adquisición y comercialización de los productos a vender con sus consecuentes secuelas de corruptela y despilfarro que siempre vienen aunadas a este tipo de transacciones.
La inflación de Enero ya esta pisando el 6%, el desabastecimiento continua en rubros muy importantes de la dieta diaria y no hay perspectivas de que este mal mejore pues el gobierno con sus políticas lo que ha logrado es la destrucción del aparato productivo nacional. La corrupción bien gracias. El loco fajado en una contienda con Colombia en la quien lleva todas las de perder somos los venezolanos, y como si todo esto no fuera suficiente la declaración de amor hacia las FARC y el ELN.
¡Madre mía! Yo dije que pensaba que el 2008 iba a ser un año difícil pero confieso que ni remotamente se me ocurrió que iba a ser tan terrible. ¡Que Dios nos agarre confesados!
Raúl Leoni has a Bachelor of Science in Agricultural Economics.degree from Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. Mr. Leoni served as Representative in the Venezuelan Congress in 1984 - 1989. Mr. Leoni is the son of Venezuelan former President Raúl Leoni.
Resources:
http://www.bartleby.com/65/le/Leoni-Ra.html
Saturday, January 12, 2008
Iran ghost flights to Venezuela
The following is unedited text that is circulating the Internet:
el original decía 8 de enero
Fecha: Fri, 11 Jan
Tubazo: Irán Air el 'Vuelo Fantasma de Maiquetía' Ayer cuando llegué a Maiquetía, mientras esperaba las maletas,conversaba con una amiga del Duty Free que está frente a las correas portaequipajes, le pregunté acerca del vuelo de Irán Air que había llegado media hora antes del mío, y me contó lo siguiente: El vuelo de Irán Air lo llaman aquí en el aeropuerto 'EL AVION FANTASMA, un Boeing 747SP configurado para 287 pasajeros, cuando llega, lo anuncian en cartelera, pero nadie ve a sus pasajeros, no pasan por inmigración y mucho menos recogen su equipaje por las correas ni salen por la puerta grande. Salen por unas puertas laterales, incluso, el pasillo lo toman al momento del desembarque la GN para que ningún empleado del aeropuerto vea a los 'pasajeros'. También de Salida, lo anuncian en cartelera (supongo que para justificar que es una ruta comercial) pero igualmente nadie ve a sus pasajeros. Se dan cuenta porque nuevamente se realiza un extraordinario evento de seguridad en
todo el aeropuerto, pues llegan en autobuses escoltados por policías y al momento del
embarque vuelven a tomar los pasillos, salen por las puertas pequeñas y nadie ve nada. También me cuenta que quienes manejan la carga del avión, no son empleados regulares
del aeropuerto, que llegan en dos vans, abren las compuertas de carga del avión, bajan
los contenedores perfectamente identificados 'Irán AIr' y los suben a camiones Civiles de
carga y desaparecen'. Esta es la confesión palabras mas, palabras menos de una empleada del aeropuerto. Mi pregunta es la de costumbre. Un gobierno cuyo modus operandis es la Clandestinidad, lo ilegal, lo oculto, lo secreto se puede catalogar de gobierno Limpio y Transparente? El gobierno de Chávez es un gobierno oscuro, sospechoso, tránsfuga, ténebre en su proceder, actúa tal cual mafia camorrera, donde todos son sospechosos. Que está
tramando Chávez y los iraníes?. Los estados unidos deberían investigar a fondo las operaciones entre Caracas y Teherán, pues lo mas seguro, que algo muy siniestro se está cocinando en nuestro PACIFICO país.
Mañana les cuento los verdaderos chismes de los vuelos sociales de Cubana de Aviación
contado por la misma empleada del aeropuerto, es para pararse los pelos. También del
porcentaje de seguidores de Chávez empleados del estado, se sorprenderán.
el original decía 8 de enero
Fecha: Fri, 11 Jan
Tubazo: Irán Air el 'Vuelo Fantasma de Maiquetía' Ayer cuando llegué a Maiquetía, mientras esperaba las maletas,conversaba con una amiga del Duty Free que está frente a las correas portaequipajes, le pregunté acerca del vuelo de Irán Air que había llegado media hora antes del mío, y me contó lo siguiente: El vuelo de Irán Air lo llaman aquí en el aeropuerto 'EL AVION FANTASMA, un Boeing 747SP configurado para 287 pasajeros, cuando llega, lo anuncian en cartelera, pero nadie ve a sus pasajeros, no pasan por inmigración y mucho menos recogen su equipaje por las correas ni salen por la puerta grande. Salen por unas puertas laterales, incluso, el pasillo lo toman al momento del desembarque la GN para que ningún empleado del aeropuerto vea a los 'pasajeros'. También de Salida, lo anuncian en cartelera (supongo que para justificar que es una ruta comercial) pero igualmente nadie ve a sus pasajeros. Se dan cuenta porque nuevamente se realiza un extraordinario evento de seguridad en
todo el aeropuerto, pues llegan en autobuses escoltados por policías y al momento del
embarque vuelven a tomar los pasillos, salen por las puertas pequeñas y nadie ve nada. También me cuenta que quienes manejan la carga del avión, no son empleados regulares
del aeropuerto, que llegan en dos vans, abren las compuertas de carga del avión, bajan
los contenedores perfectamente identificados 'Irán AIr' y los suben a camiones Civiles de
carga y desaparecen'. Esta es la confesión palabras mas, palabras menos de una empleada del aeropuerto. Mi pregunta es la de costumbre. Un gobierno cuyo modus operandis es la Clandestinidad, lo ilegal, lo oculto, lo secreto se puede catalogar de gobierno Limpio y Transparente? El gobierno de Chávez es un gobierno oscuro, sospechoso, tránsfuga, ténebre en su proceder, actúa tal cual mafia camorrera, donde todos son sospechosos. Que está
tramando Chávez y los iraníes?. Los estados unidos deberían investigar a fondo las operaciones entre Caracas y Teherán, pues lo mas seguro, que algo muy siniestro se está cocinando en nuestro PACIFICO país.
Mañana les cuento los verdaderos chismes de los vuelos sociales de Cubana de Aviación
contado por la misma empleada del aeropuerto, es para pararse los pelos. También del
porcentaje de seguidores de Chávez empleados del estado, se sorprenderán.
Friday, January 4, 2008
What Are the Chances for the Release of Three FARC Hostages?
Inter-American Dialogue's
Latin American Advisor
Republished by authorization of Erik Brand
Plans by Colombia's FARC rebels to hand over three hostages—former vice presidential candidate, Clara Rojas, her three year-old son Emmanuel, and former congresswoman Consuelo Gonzalez—to the government of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez appeared to have fallen apart on Monday, with the FARC and the Colombian government blaming each other for the initiative's failure. What are the chances now for the hostages' release? Among Chavez, the FARC, and Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, who are the biggest winners and losers as a result of the current impasse?
A: Board Comment: Diego Arria: "The FARC-Chavez operation—absurdly—was probably the most publicly advertised hostage rescue operation ever, even with Hollywood's Oliver Stone invited to shoot the delivery of the hostages to Hugo Chavez, who dressed in military fatigues and performed before the national and international media as the FARC's spokesman, providing details on the operation. By divulging the whereabouts of the Venezuelan helicopters that were available to pick up the hostages, who could have been easily tracked by satellites, Chavez must have surely increased the FARC's concerns about their own security, which could explain why they failed Chavez for the second time (previously not releasing Ingrid Betancourt as Chavez had promised French President Nicolas Sarkozy). Had Chavez followed the King of Spain's advice—'Por qué no te callas' (why don't you shut up)—most probably the operation would have succeeded. The biggest losers so far are the families of two non–combatant, innocent women and the child. The FARC leadership is in significant debt to Chavez as its main supporter and will find a way to deliver them, but not with the display that Chavez needed to boost his very tarnished image at the expense of President Uribe for terminating his role as a negotiator for the release of Betancourt. FARC leaders that visit Chavez in Venezuela know well how to enter the country safely. Whom to blame depends on whether to believe the FARC version—supplied by Chavez—or the Uribe government. To accept the version of a criminal narco-terrorist organization, as former Argentine President Nestor Kirchner and other Chavez Latin American allies did, instead of the oldest democracy in Latin Americashould be a matter of great concern to all. Make no mistake—the most important reality of this fiasco is that hostage delivery had little to do with humanitarian concern, and a lot to do with the perverse new dimension of terrorism: hostage trafficking. And this is precisely what the FARC and Hugo Chavez have done and will continue to attempt."
A: Guest Comment: Peter DeShazo: "The failed attempt to achieve the release of the three hostages underscores the difficulty of dealing with the FARC, even under circumstances in which the guerrilla organization hoped to score some political points by a unilateral 'humanitarian' gesture. Determined efforts by President Pastrana toward the end of his administration and under President Uribe's 'democratic security' policy over the past five years turned the tables on the FARC militarily, pushing them into a defensive position deeper in the hinterlands and sapping their operational capability. Estimates of the FARC's order of battle strength show a reduction of 40 percent from its zenith in the 1998-2002 period, with increasingly more veteran cadres deserting. As the military and economic circumstances of the FARC further deteriorate, the hundreds of hostages in FARC hands become an even more valuable bargaining resource. By dangling the potential of releasing high-profile hostages before domestic and international audiences, the FARC seeks to bolster its flagging image as a viable insurgency. Revelations of the terrible conditions under which FARC hostages are held, however, have further tarnished the FARC's reputation for cruelty, so that its initiatives to broker a hostage exchange or release become a double-edged sword. The collapse of this latest attempt at a hostage release raises further doubts about the command and control capabilities of FARC leadership. The successful release of hostages not only would have given the FARC some positive publicity but also would have underscored the FARC's admiration for Venezuelan President Chavez. The FARC has released hostages on past occasions without difficulty. When for whatever reason this initiative fell through, however, Chavez was left embarrassed and the FARC appeared duplicitous, incompetent, or both. Uribe, who allowed the operation to move forward, came out ahead—indeed, the Colombian people feel great solidarity with the suffering of the hostages and welcome efforts to bring about their release. Of course, the biggest losers in all this are the more than 750 hostages still in FARC hands, many of them suffering long captivities under barbaric conditions."
A: Guest Comment: Dan Restrepo: "We must not forget that the clearest losers here are the estimated 3,000 men, women, and children being held against their will by the FARC. Who wins and loses among presidents Uribe and Chavez and the FARC depends largely on the pending DNA test results. If the Colombian government's 'hypothesis' regarding the whereabouts of Emmanuel is validated, the FARC, exposed as fundamentally dysfunctional or deeply cynical or both, will be a clear loser. Such a result would also underscore the limits of President Chavez's influence. President Uribe would emerge, at least in the short-term, as a winner. He will, however, likely face the 'what did he know and when did he know it' questions regarding the true whereabouts of Emmanuel. The answers to those questions and the manner in which the 'hypothesis' was made public could also have negative long-term consequences in securing the freedom of the FARC-held hostages. If the Colombian government's hypothesis is not supported by the DNA results, President Uribe will find himself in a very difficult position. President Chavez will find some vindication, but unless he secures the release of at least these three FARC-held hostages, it will not be complete vindication. Having focused attention on their hostage taking, it is difficult to discern how the FARC emerges as a winner under virtually any scenario."
Diego Arria is a member of the Advisor board and Director of the Columbus Group.
Peter DeShazo is Director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies.
Dan Restrepo is Director of The Americas Project at the Center for American Progress.
Latin American Advisor
Republished by authorization of Erik Brand
Plans by Colombia's FARC rebels to hand over three hostages—former vice presidential candidate, Clara Rojas, her three year-old son Emmanuel, and former congresswoman Consuelo Gonzalez—to the government of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez appeared to have fallen apart on Monday, with the FARC and the Colombian government blaming each other for the initiative's failure. What are the chances now for the hostages' release? Among Chavez, the FARC, and Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, who are the biggest winners and losers as a result of the current impasse?
A: Board Comment: Diego Arria: "The FARC-Chavez operation—absurdly—was probably the most publicly advertised hostage rescue operation ever, even with Hollywood's Oliver Stone invited to shoot the delivery of the hostages to Hugo Chavez, who dressed in military fatigues and performed before the national and international media as the FARC's spokesman, providing details on the operation. By divulging the whereabouts of the Venezuelan helicopters that were available to pick up the hostages, who could have been easily tracked by satellites, Chavez must have surely increased the FARC's concerns about their own security, which could explain why they failed Chavez for the second time (previously not releasing Ingrid Betancourt as Chavez had promised French President Nicolas Sarkozy). Had Chavez followed the King of Spain's advice—'Por qué no te callas' (why don't you shut up)—most probably the operation would have succeeded. The biggest losers so far are the families of two non–combatant, innocent women and the child. The FARC leadership is in significant debt to Chavez as its main supporter and will find a way to deliver them, but not with the display that Chavez needed to boost his very tarnished image at the expense of President Uribe for terminating his role as a negotiator for the release of Betancourt. FARC leaders that visit Chavez in Venezuela know well how to enter the country safely. Whom to blame depends on whether to believe the FARC version—supplied by Chavez—or the Uribe government. To accept the version of a criminal narco-terrorist organization, as former Argentine President Nestor Kirchner and other Chavez Latin American allies did, instead of the oldest democracy in Latin Americashould be a matter of great concern to all. Make no mistake—the most important reality of this fiasco is that hostage delivery had little to do with humanitarian concern, and a lot to do with the perverse new dimension of terrorism: hostage trafficking. And this is precisely what the FARC and Hugo Chavez have done and will continue to attempt."
A: Guest Comment: Peter DeShazo: "The failed attempt to achieve the release of the three hostages underscores the difficulty of dealing with the FARC, even under circumstances in which the guerrilla organization hoped to score some political points by a unilateral 'humanitarian' gesture. Determined efforts by President Pastrana toward the end of his administration and under President Uribe's 'democratic security' policy over the past five years turned the tables on the FARC militarily, pushing them into a defensive position deeper in the hinterlands and sapping their operational capability. Estimates of the FARC's order of battle strength show a reduction of 40 percent from its zenith in the 1998-2002 period, with increasingly more veteran cadres deserting. As the military and economic circumstances of the FARC further deteriorate, the hundreds of hostages in FARC hands become an even more valuable bargaining resource. By dangling the potential of releasing high-profile hostages before domestic and international audiences, the FARC seeks to bolster its flagging image as a viable insurgency. Revelations of the terrible conditions under which FARC hostages are held, however, have further tarnished the FARC's reputation for cruelty, so that its initiatives to broker a hostage exchange or release become a double-edged sword. The collapse of this latest attempt at a hostage release raises further doubts about the command and control capabilities of FARC leadership. The successful release of hostages not only would have given the FARC some positive publicity but also would have underscored the FARC's admiration for Venezuelan President Chavez. The FARC has released hostages on past occasions without difficulty. When for whatever reason this initiative fell through, however, Chavez was left embarrassed and the FARC appeared duplicitous, incompetent, or both. Uribe, who allowed the operation to move forward, came out ahead—indeed, the Colombian people feel great solidarity with the suffering of the hostages and welcome efforts to bring about their release. Of course, the biggest losers in all this are the more than 750 hostages still in FARC hands, many of them suffering long captivities under barbaric conditions."
A: Guest Comment: Dan Restrepo: "We must not forget that the clearest losers here are the estimated 3,000 men, women, and children being held against their will by the FARC. Who wins and loses among presidents Uribe and Chavez and the FARC depends largely on the pending DNA test results. If the Colombian government's 'hypothesis' regarding the whereabouts of Emmanuel is validated, the FARC, exposed as fundamentally dysfunctional or deeply cynical or both, will be a clear loser. Such a result would also underscore the limits of President Chavez's influence. President Uribe would emerge, at least in the short-term, as a winner. He will, however, likely face the 'what did he know and when did he know it' questions regarding the true whereabouts of Emmanuel. The answers to those questions and the manner in which the 'hypothesis' was made public could also have negative long-term consequences in securing the freedom of the FARC-held hostages. If the Colombian government's hypothesis is not supported by the DNA results, President Uribe will find himself in a very difficult position. President Chavez will find some vindication, but unless he secures the release of at least these three FARC-held hostages, it will not be complete vindication. Having focused attention on their hostage taking, it is difficult to discern how the FARC emerges as a winner under virtually any scenario."
Diego Arria is a member of the Advisor board and Director of the Columbus Group.
Peter DeShazo is Director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies.
Dan Restrepo is Director of The Americas Project at the Center for American Progress.
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